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COMPULSORY MENTAL TREATMENT AND THE
REQUIREMENTS OF "DUE PROCESS"
NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE*
After nearly one hundred years of agitation and at least three Royal
Commissions, the British Parliament early last year finally prepared
to act on a brand new Mental Health Bill.' Meritorious on many
counts, the bill, nevertheless, was criticized by some legal authorities
as lacking adequate guarantees of individual rights. Under the bill, a
person alleged to be mentally ill may be brought to a hospital and
detained there upon the certificate of two private physicians, there
being no requirement for a prior court hearing. And unless the patient
demands and succeeds in getting a review of his case by a special
review tribunal, such medical-administrative detention may be ex-
tended indefinitely.2
Until the very end, the opposition to the bill had hoped that
Prime Minister Macmillan might call a general election in the Spring,
in which eventuality Parliament would have been adjourned and all
business before it would have been discontinued. Or, this failing, it
was hoped that the meager cells of resistance to the bill would suc-
ceed in enlisting stronger support. But these speculations did not
materialize. Thus England, mother of the Magna Carta and the Bill
of Rights, gave birth to a new law for the compulsory treatment of
the mentally ill which provides only a vague definition of mental
illness and permits the commitment of alleged mental patients with-
out benefit of any judicial determination. Admittedly, in the hurly-
burly of the legislative battle the opponents failed to grant the bill its
full due for endeavoring to remove from mental illness the stigma of
criminality and public disdain and fear. This the bill most faithfully
undertook to do. Yet, in the excitement of reform the proponents
likewise apparently forgot that individual rights have almost as often
been infringed upon by those professing to do good as by those ad-
mitting to do evil.
The adoption of the bill3 is not surprising for it follows a trend
that has become in recent times increasingly prevalent in Anglo-Amer-
ican law-a shift from the strict judicial process to more relaxed and
* Special Counsel, Antitrust & Monopoly Subcommittee, U.S. Senate; former
Director, Project on the Rights of the Mentally Ill, American Bar Foundation; Member
of the Council of State Governments' Committee on Mental Retardation.
1 Bill 53, 7 Ellz. 2 (1958).
2 Bill 53, 7 Eliz. 2, part IV, § 26 (1958).
3 Mental Health Act, 1959 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72.
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less precise quasi-judicial and administrative procedures.4 This shift,
carried out in the name of more effective justice and purporting to
provide more specialized and speedier law, has been apparent not
only in new areas of social control, such as juvenile delinquency and
sexual psychopathy, but has also been felt in areas such as compulsory
mental treatment, which have old standing and strict judicial tradi-
tions. The shift has been widely endorsed by social reformers as a
departure from anachronistic legal formalism. But several islands of
resistance have persisted in arguing that what is referred to as legal
formalism is in fact an essential guarantee of individual liberties.
What is an unusual and possibly the most ludicrous feature of this
trend is that it coincides with a recent reverse trend in Soviet law,
carried out in the name of greater individual liberty and restoring
many of the traditional concepts of "due process of law" which were
originally discarded as bourgeois nonsense. 5
The enactment of the new British Mental Health Bill will un-
doubtediy give impetus to the American movement for similar reform
in mental illness law. It is generally conceded that such reform is
overdue. As long as a hundred years ago it was already claimed by a
leading psychiatrist that.. . "while so much has been done ... to pro-
mote the comfort of the insane ... we remain perfectly satisfied with
the wisdom of our predecessors in everything relative to their legal rela-
tion." 6 Still, despite the number and complexity of the legal problems
posed by mental illness, this -was until recent years one of the most
neglected of all legal fields.
The failure of this field to get its due legal attention can be
primarily explained by the absence of a moving power behind it. Un-
fortunately, the "insanity" field was deprived of its most powerful
lobby through a process of human erosion, in institutions where cure
was the exception rather than the rule. With the voice of the mentally
ill themselves muted and their families either too willing to be relieved
of the burden of care, or too poor, or too eager to conceal the family
"stigma," appeals to legislature, the courts and the legal profession
were rather few. This legal situation, however, appears to have been
part and parcel of a general pattern of neglect in everything connected
with mental illness.
"Though human mental illness is ages old," says a recent com-
4 Kadish, "A Case Study in the Signification of Procedural Due Process," 2
Western Political Quarterly 93 (1956).
5 Recent dispatches from Russia in daily and periodical press. Time, January 5,
1959, p. 32.
6 Ray, Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, 1838, as quoted in Zilboorg, "Legal
Aspects of Psychiatry," in One Hundred Years of American Psychiatry 547 (1944).
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mentator, "virtually everything known today about its physical treat-
ment has been learned in the last twenty years."'7 But with the recent
growth in medical knowledge and the development of new concepts
of institutional care-coupled with the ability of chemistry and medi-
cine, at long last, to offer a glimmer of hope for effective treatment
and cure-pressures have mounted for a total reappraisal of society's
attitude toward mental illness. Since much of this attitude is reflected
and shaped by the applicable legal framework, special attention has
been directed to the need for legal reform. Many have criticized the
law for its unwillingness to change rapidly enough, yet against them
there have been others who fear that hasty and unwarranted reforms
may remove the traditional legal safeguards without providing ade-
quate substitutes.
Whether adhering to one view or the other, it can be generally
conceded that the increased knowledge of mental illness and the
developments in the therapeutic sciences now provide the law with
the evidence and motives for a reappraisal of its role. This is the
function of this paper. In undertaking such a reappraisal, we shall
need to deal not only with the general pattern of the law as it now
exists and with the social motives and aims underlying such laws, but
also with the basic constitutional concepts which may determine to
what extent the reforms instituted in England and on the Continent
can be undertaken in this country. Of particular interest will be the
constitutional requirement of "due process," which incorporates in it
the sum total of American society's concept of legal fair play and
which has come to mean not only the observation of procedural pro-
priety but also the maintenance of an appropriate balance between
the public and the individual, the general interests and the special
ones.
Mental illness provides a field wherein there exist urgent new
social needs. An evaluation of the law pertaining to the mentally ill
thus provides an especially fitting opportunity for the assessment of
the meaning of "due process" in a changing social order. And what
is learned here about the flexibility and adaptability of the law could
probably provide adequate guideposts for application in other areas
as well.
THE HISTORY OF COMMITMENTS TO MENTAL INSTITUTIONS
Mental disability is one of the country's great concerns of the
day. More than half of all the beds in our hospitals are occupied by
mental patients, and the economic and human losses due to mental
illness are immeasurable. Of the approximately 11,400 children born
7 Martin, "Inside the Asylum," Sat. Eve. Post, Nov. 10, 1956, p. 130.
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each day in this country, 340 are mentally deficient. Of every twelve
children born currently, one, according to recent projections, will at
some time in his life suffer a mental illness severe enough to require
hospitalization. There are about 1,500,000 people in the United States
suffering from mental illness, about the same number of mentally
deficient people and some 7,500,000 who have some other personality
disturbance.'
Not all of those who require mental treatment obtain it, but
even so the statistics of mental patients are staggering. Over 250,000
new patients are committed to mental institutions each year-three
times as many people as are sentenced to state and federal prisons.
Over one million patients are on the books of the mental institutions
-more than five times the total prison population. The figures would
be even higher if the laws providing for the commitment of alcoholics,
drug addicts and epileptics were more fully utilized. It is estimated
that there are more than three million excessive users of alcohol in
this country, a million and a half epileptics and an unknown number
of drug addicts, most of whom are subject to commitment.9
To understand the role and functioning of commitment in Amer-
ican law we must examine its origins. These we must trace to 17th,
18th and 19th century economic and social development in England
and in America.
The commitment of the mentally ill, in its modern sense, was
unknown in American law until about the first quarter of the last
century. 10 The mentally ill came in contact with various phases of
the law long before that, but these contacts were either for the pur-
pose of property protection-as in the case of guardianship-or else
lacked the combination of compulsion and permanence inherent in
commitment. The violent mentally ill were then accorded the treat-
ment applicable to criminals generally, which consisted of detention
in jails. The non-violent and indigent insane, on the other hand, were
treated in the same fashion as were all other paupers, by being pro-
vided with food and shelter. But these practices took no notice of the
distinctive character of the mentally ill as a class, and it was only
after mental institutions became prevalent that commitment to them
finally introduced a system designed especially for the mentally ill.
This, however, happened only with the increasing state interest in
public welfare and the advent of the public mental institutions.
s American Psychiatric Assoc. & N.A.M.H. Joint Information Service, Fact Sheet
No. 5, Table 3 (March, 1958).
9 American Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled and the Law, A Draft Report
of the Project on the Rights of the Mentally Ill 30-35 (1958).
10 Consult Deutsch, The Mentally Ill in America (2d ed. 1949).
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Conimitment establishes a system of compulsory custody and
treatment for the mentally ill. It does this through physical control
and supervision over the person of the mentally ill, which control is
usually delegated by the state to a public or private institution. This
control must be distinguished from the power of guardianship. Guardi-
anship is a much older institution and its major emphasis is upon the
protection of the proprietary assets of the mentally ill, the protection
of the personal interests being secondary only.
The authority of the state over the person of the insane may be
traced to three different sources. The state as the preserver of the
peace may exercise its police power in all cases where the public
peace is disturbed or is being threatened." One of the first contacts
between the law and the mentally ill was therefore in the case of the
"furiously mad," those requiring immediate confinement in order to
stop, or to prevent, acts of violence. 2 The right of the state to re-
strain the violent is given recognition by early statutory enactments,
but its origin predates legislation, and it is said to be one of the in-
herent rights of the sovereign.13 Even the Constitution, according to
many authorities, supposes the pre-existence of the police power.'4
This police power was later modified and incorporated in the com-
mitment laws, but even today the common law police power may
serve as authority for the control of the mentally ill when legislation
is not available.
A second source for the state authority is the sovereign's posi-
tion as parens patriae, the father of the country. 5 As parens patriae,
it was the sovereign's function to protect the proprietary and personal
interest of his subjects. "The King," says a typical commentator, "as
the political father and guardian of his kingdom, has the protection
of all his subjects, and of their lands and goods; and he is bound, in
a more peculiar manner to take care of those who, by reason of their
imbecility and want of understanding, are incapable of taking care
of themselves." 6 The guardianship of the legally disabled in England
was originally a role performed by the feudal lord as the master of
the manor, but this function was assumed by the King during the
11 The reference here is to the police power in the strict or narrow sense. In a
broader sense the term could encompass all state actions. See Freund, Police Power, iii,
242 (1904).
12 For one of the first laws of this kind in this country, see New York Laws ch.
31 (1788).
13 Eubank v. Richmond 226 U.S. 136 (1921); Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N.C. 722,
143 S.E. 530, 536 (1928); 11 Am. Jur. "Insane Persons" § 245.
14 11 Am. Jur., "Insane Persons" § 245.
15 Blackstone, Commentaries 427 (1783).
16 Shelford, The Law Concerning Lunatics 9 (1833).
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latter part of the 13th century, once the Crown's position became
consolidated. Early historians say that the guardianship of incom-
petents was made into a royal duty in order to end the abuses in-
herent in the more decentralized earlier arrangements. 17 A more
critical history of this transfer of duties must not fail to emphasize
also the political and economic advantages to the Crown resulting
from it. The assumption of the new function permitted the King not
only to supervise the management and transfer of the property of the
insane but also provided him with a source of revenue from the profits
of the estates under his guardianship.'" The sovereign's function as
parens patriae was later delegated to the Lord Chancellor, and in the
United States it was inherited by the individual states. From this
source grew primarily the incompetency and guardianship laws, but
the theory of parens patriae had its effect also upon commitment
theory and legislation.
Of more recent origin is the authority assumed by the state over
insane persons as members of the "pauper" community. In England
up to 1600 it was the Church that was responsible for relieving the
needs of the poor. Due to the Reformation and the economic changes
of that time the Church was no longer equal to the task, and the civil
authorities were forced to assume the responsibility under the Poor
Law. The destitute insane were thus accorded the same treatment as
paupers generally and were exposed to the same experiments in public
care-workhouses, the farming out to contractors, the payment of
doles and the hiring to farmers.19 The abuses of the system finally
brought an end to the practices of providing relief outside institu-
tions, and well-regulated workhouses became the only recognized
forms of poor care. From these workhouses the public asylum for the
mentally ill branched out as a specialized institution. The American
experience was very similar, and only after the middle of the last
century did the American system of poor relief, based largely on the
early English Poor Law, move to provide completely separate facili-
ties for the insane and the feeble-minded.
The original commitment procedures were extremely informal.
The 1851 Illinois commitment statute, for example, provided that
"married women and infants who, in the judgment of the medical
superintendents of the state asylum at Jacksonville, are evidently
insane or distracted, may be entered or detained at the request of
the husband or the guardian of the infant, without the evidence re-
quired in other cases."20
17 Id. at 10; 2 Reeves, History of the English Law 307 (1814).
18 Blackstone, Commentaries 303 (1783).
19 18 Encyclopaedia Britannica 214 (1943).
20 Ill. Laws 1851, § 10, at p. 96, 98.
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But the increase in the number of commitments and the absence
of controls and supervision finally resulted in abuses, and it was as
a consequence of these abuses that the elaborate procedural details
of present day commitment were generally adopted. The most famous
crusader for the tightening of the commitment laws in this country was
Mrs. Packard, an ex-patient who set out in the 1860's to stir up
public concern to make "railroading" to lunatic asylums impossible.2 '
Her exposes resulted in the introduction of many of the formal legal
safeguards of due process into this field, including the right to a hear-
ing and a jury trial in determining the question of insanity. The new
laws drew mainly from the early incompetency proceedings and
criminal law practices, neither of which was especially well suited for
the new purpose.
Many, especially psychiatrists and the allied professions, have
argued over the years that the introduction of these legal formalities
made treatment less accessible and retarded the development of
mental health. Others argued that the introduction of legal principles
into the insanity field was of great importance and that legal guaran-
tees are necessary whenever society sets out to deprive its members
of their liberty or property, whether in criminal cases or in others.
The formal procedures for commitment have existed for about
a century with few modifications. In recent years, however, there
have been many attempts at change, and the claim has been often
repeated that the law has failed to recognize the new needs and the
better ideas in this area.
WHO IS SUBJECT TO COMMITMENT?
In the common law tradition the involuntary restraint and de-
tention of an insane person was justified as part of the sovereign's
police power, but its exercise was limited to situations involving
danger to persons or property. The jail usually provided the facilities
necessary for such restraint. With the advent of the public mental
institution in the middle of the nineteenth century, facilities were
created not only for short-term restraint but also for long-term com-
mitments.
Although no clear, formal departure from the rule that commit-
ments should be limited to the dangerously insane has ever occurred,
present commitment policies are much broader. This liberalization
came into effect almost unnoticed, for at no time have the legal prin-
ciples underlying it been given appropriate consideration and atten-
tion. One writer maintains that the liberalized trend was given judicial
21 Curran, "Hospitalization of the Mentally Il1," 31 N.C.L. Rev. 274, 276 (1952-
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endorsement by Chief Justice Shaw as early as 1845,22 but the cited
case contains no clear expression of such view.3 That this case can
and need be considered a landmark in the development of commit-
ment law serves as one more illustration of the scarcity of legal
thought in this area.
The broader commitment policy has been evident not only in
the day-to-day commitment practices but also in the language of the
law. In many states the commitment laws now accept the patient's
"need for treatment" as a condition justifying commitment and do
not require a showing that there is a likelihood of danger should the
person remain untreated. Only eleven states any longer use the term
"dangerous" in describing those who may be committed. A recent
Pennsylvania statute permits instead the commitment of anyone who
suffers from a mental illness which "... lessens the capacity of a person
to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in the con-
duct of his affairs and social relations."24 The Draft Act for the Hos-
pitalization of the Mentally 11125 likewise provides for the commit-
ment of those who are "in need of care or treatment" and lack suf-
ficient capacity to make responsible decisions regarding admission.
While most statutes emphasize the protective and curative ele-
ments for commitment, some have embarked on different directions.
Massachusetts, for example, apparently makes social nonconformity
grounds for commitment and provides for the involuntary hospitaliza-
tion of any person subject to a "character disorder" which renders
him so deficient in "judgment or emotional control" that he is likely
to conduct himself in a manner which "clearly violates the estab-
lished ... conventions of the community."2 6 These provisions, which
are generally recommended by medical circles as a means of reaching
ill people in early stages, have been viewed with alarm by many. If
these acts would allow the indeterminate hospitalization of the severe
"neurotic" against their will, it is said, this cannot rest on the doctrine
of parens patriae nor can it rest on the public health or police powers
of the state. It might be related to the public welfare, but it is se-
riously questioned if the public welfare is sufficiently involved to
support such deprivation of liberty." A number of persons with
cancer or heart disease do not possess sufficient knowledge of their
22 Id. at 274, 291.
23 Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1S45).
24 Pennsylvania Mental Health Act of 1951, § 102 (11).
25 National Institute of Mental Health, Federal Security Agency, A Draft Act
Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, § 9(g) (3) (Public Health Service Pub.
No. 51, 1952).
26 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123, § 1 (Cum. Supp. 1956).
27 Curran, supra note 21, at 291.
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illness to understand that hospitalization would be best for them; or,
if they have such knowledge, they may still refuse to follow medical
advice which would prolong their lives or improve their health. Should
this latter group be treated in the same manner as it is proposed to
treat the mentally ill?
Even a limited analysis of the. statutes, the practices and mental
illness statistics indicates that commitment has served as a multi-
purpose remedy. Commitment has served not only to prevent breaches
of the peace and harm to persons or property but also to provide
treatment and attempt recovery, to relieve the family of the need to
care for a disabled member, and to provide a place for the miscel-
laneous groups of problematic and maladjusted people that would not
fit anywhere else.28 The relative importance of these purposes in the
commitment pattern has not always been the same and has increased
or decreased with social and technological changes. Obviously little
consideration was given to the curative aspects of commitment as
long as the medical arts were helpless in the treatment of mental
illness. Likewise, changing social conditions and the absence of other
facilities have tended in recent years to turn commitment and the
mental institution into a dumping ground for the aged, the senile and
many unwanted others. A recent report describing the Texas situation
thus claims that ". . . seventy per cent of all the patients don't need to
be in a mental hospital .... They could be treated at home, in clinics,
or other institutions. 29
Whether custodial, curative or protective, all these commitment
purposes appear to be worthwhile social aims. But whether, under our
system of laws, compulsion and legal sanction may be used for the
accomplishment of these purposes is a question not fully determined.
In recent years the opposition to liberalized commitment has
become increasingly vocal. Say they:
The citizen's right to his personal behavior and beliefs cannot
be infringed upon where his behavior injures neither himself or
others. Social nonconformity is often called mental illness. Hasn't
an individual the right to believe, act or seek cures according to
his own ideas? Hasn't he the right to refuse medical judgments
and treatments on the grounds of individual choice? 30
The medical people, on the other hand, preach preventive medicine
and argue that to wait until a mentally ill person becomes dangerous
is to delay improperly the needed treatment. Mental illness, they say,
28 Belknap, Human Problems of a State Mental Hospital 32 (1956).
29 Gainfort, "How Texas is Reforming Its Mental Hospitals," The Reporter, Nov.
29, 1956, p. 19.
30 Memorandum submitted by Mrs. Margaret Seeger to the American Bar Founda-
tion, Feb. 12, 1957.
[Vol. 21
COMPULSORY MENTAL TREATMENT
differs from all other illnesses in that it affects the mental processes,
and it is society's duty to provide treatment for it because of the ill
person's inability to recognize his own need.
In addition to the constitutional doubts as to the justification for
compulsory commitment when the purpose is curative only, there is
also the question of the propriety of such commitments under the
present hospital conditions. If the theory of curative commitment is
constitutionally valid, the argument goes, its validity must further
depend on whether or not the committed persons receive whatever care
and treatment modern medicine has at its disposal. But present mental
hospital facilities and staffs are incapable of furnishing adequate
services to the more serious cases requiring hospitalization because of
protective considerations. What justification is there for broadening
the commitment policy to permit compulsory commitment for curative
purposes when it is known that no treatment would be forthcoming?
PROCEDURES FOR COMPULSORY TREATMENT
Although the term "compulsory commitment" would appear to
imply actual compulsion, it must be stressed that this is not always
the case. In actuality, all the cases in which the request for hos-
pitalization does not originate with the patient are considered as in-
voluntary commitments." Involuntary commitment will, therefore,
signify that there was a lack of volition on the part of the committed
patient, but it will not necessarily imply that the patient was actively
opposing the attempt to hospitalize him. The term thus encompasses
the passive and nonvoluntary entry as well as the one which must be
accomplished against the will of the patient and despite his resistance.
This fact must be kept in mind in evaluating the commitment proce-
dures to determine the adequacy of the protection they provide. The
traditional symbols of due process, such as notice and hearing, would
obviously have a different meaning and value for the lucid patient
actively opposing his commitment than for the passive patient who
is not fully aware of what is happening.
Commitment procedures until a century ago were highly in-
formal, both here and in England. In fact some of the early proce-
dural requirements were designed not so much to prevent the improper
commitment of unwilling, innocent people as to keep out paupers
who were only too willing to seek admission to these publicly sup-
ported institutions.32
31 Federal Security Agency, A Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally
Ill, § 5 at 22 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1952).
32 Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency,
Report 68 (1957).
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Once mental institutions became more prevalent and the number
of admissions increased, more elaborate procedural protections be-
came a necessity. The new safeguards were primarily for the protec-
tion of the patient, but they also acted to protect the institutional
officials against charges of malfeasance and wrongful detention by
ex-patients 3  The developments in commitment legislation during the
last century have, therefore, tended for the most part to emphasize
the formalities and technicalities of "due process," including notice,
hearing, right to counsel and a jury trial. Only in recent years has
this trend towards formalism been reversed, and many of the new
statutes now exhibit a considerable departure from past legal for-
malities.
Due to the fact that commitment procedures are a matter for
state legislation, the development of these procedures has followed
devious paths throughout the country. Occasionally the states have
copied the commitment procedures of each other, and in recent years
the provisions of the Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally
Ill (proposed a few years back as a model for state adoption by the
Federal Security Agency) have been used as a basis for the law in
some six states. 34 But generally the unifying influences have been
few and the commitment procedures have varied widely in the several
states. These procedures range from those requiring a full-dress
judicial hearing and determination to those that eliminate the judicial
determination altogether, permitting it on appeal only. Some states
may have several of these different procedures at their disposal.
In spite of the great amount of variation, the procedures for
compulsory hospitalization may be divided into three major patterns,
the distinguishing feature being the agency that has final responsibility
for the determination of the need for commitment and the making of
the commitment order." Some thirty-four states require a hearing
before a judge and the issuance of an order by him before commit-
ment may be effectuated. In about half of these states the law
specifically provides for a jury trial, which may be had on the demand
of the patient or at the discretion of the judge. Although not depart-
ing from the requirement of a hearing, seven other states provide
that such hearing be before a special non-judicial tribunal consisting
of legal and medical experts as well as lay representatives. In fifteen
33 Deutsch, op. cit. supra note 10, at 423.
34 National Institute of Mental Health, Federal Security Agency, A Draft Act
Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51,
1952).
35 The following analyses of the commitment procedures are derived from American
Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (A Draft Report of the Project
on the Rights of the Mentally Ill) (1958).
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states, however, commitment may be effected without a prior hearing
before an independent tribunal. These states require merely that an
application for commitment be prepared by a relative or a public
official, that it be accompanied by a medical certificate, and that these
be submitted to the hospital authorities at the time the patient is
presented. On the basis of these documents the mental institution
may hold the patient indeterminately. The patient will, however, be
accorded a hearing subsequent to his commitment if he specifically
requests it.
Although there is no typical commitment procedure, there are
certain procedural elements which are present in the majority of the
commitment laws. Even the more recent procedural innovations which
permit commitment without a hearing have adopted the preliminary
steps required in the more formal commitment procedures. The
general pattern of the commitment procedure can be described as
follows: proceedings are usually set in motion by a sworn petition of
relatives, friends, certain officials or any citizen. A certificate by one
or more physicians stating that the person is mentally ill and in need
of commitment must accompany the petition. In the states permitting
commitment without a preliminary hearing the procedure is terminated
here, and the alleged mentally ill person may be admitted into the
institution. In the other states the person sought to be committed must
be notified of the proceedings and usually is required to be present
at a hearing. In many states the court or the special tribunal appoints
physicians to examine the alleged patient. This examination is usually
very informal and is held before the final hearing. In many states
the person may ask that his case be heard by a jury. Following the
hearing the judge or the commission is required to make a formal
order of commitment if the evidence is found to require such action.36
Some of the procedural elements mentioned above are present
in all commitment laws; others, though common in the past, are now
on their way out. Many of these elements have been continuously
challenged as "last-ditch stands of archaic legal prerogatives. 3 7 It
is essential that a critical present-day evaluation be undertaken to
determine the need and feasibility of reform.
"DUE PROCESS" GUARANTEES OF INDIvIDUAL RIGHTS
To enact the new Mental Health Bill the British Parliament had
but one prerequisite: a majority of votes. Once the necessary third
reading of the bill was over, its provisions went into effect, unchallenge-
36 Guttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 291 (1952).
37 Kansas Legislative Council, Psychiatric Facilities in Kansas 5 (Publication No.
143, November 1946).
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able by either the judiciary or the executive. But the adoption of re-
forms in American mental illness laws requires not only public and
legislative support but also conformity with long recognized constitu-
tional standards of "due process." True, the original sources for such
standards as "due process" and "the law of the land" are in the ancient
and basic documents of English history, but these appear unenforceable
in their mother country while their judicial interpretation and enforce-
ment have become a living art in their adopted country.
It is in the Magna Carta that, on May 10, 1215, the term "law of
the land" originated. This treaty between King John and the enraged
upper classes was designed to guarantee that "no freemen shall be
taken and imprisoned or disseized or exiled or in any way destroyed,
nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful
judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.238
Since the Magna Carta was merely a personal treaty rather
than a statute, it required reaffirmation each time a new monarch
ascended to the throne. Consequently, it became the custom for each
successive king to reaffirm the previous charters at each political
crisis.39 It was in connection with one of these confirmations that
the phrase "due process of law" first came into being. This occurred
in 1354 during the reign of Edward 111,40 when the King promised in
the "Statute of Westminister of the Liberties of London" that "no
man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of Land
or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to
Death, without being brought to Answer by due process of the Law.""'
The context in which this new phrase is found is strikingly similar
to that in which the "law of the land" appears in the Magna Carta.
The natural inference that the phrases "law of the land" and "due
process of law" were intended to be synonymous is given additional
weight by a direct reference to that effect in another statute issued
by the same king nine years later. Some have suggested that originally
the phrase "law of the land" may have referred to substantive rights,
while "due process" possibly referred merely to procedure.42 But such
distinction was not generally accepted, and the two terms have been
recognized as interchangeable in American law.43
The concept of -"due process" came to America with the first
38 Barrington, Magna Carta 239 (1900).
39 Mott, Due Process of Law 4 (1926).
40 1 Statutes of the Realm 345.
41 Statute of 28 Edward III.
42 Guthrie, Magna Carta and Other Essays 21 (1916).
43 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Murray v. Hoboken Land and




settlers. In the earliest of the colonization charters the "rights of
Englishmen" in England were given to the colonists." The early colo-
nists, although not trained lawyers and often somewhat hazy on legal
matters, were nevertheless concerned with individual rights, and many
of their first documents of government incorporated references to "due
process." 45
In the declarations of rights drawn up by the colonists in the
war constitutions, considerable attention was given to the listing of
individual liberties. But it was only in the fifth amendment to the
federal constitution in 1791 that the first use was made of the phrase
"due process of law" in an American constitution. As first adopted,
the federal constitution contained no article guaranteeing the citizens
of the new union the rights of "due process of law," and this produced
numerous objections to the document. Indeed, seven of the notifying
states proposed amendments covering this defect.46 To meet this
objection the First Congress passed in 1789 twelve proposals for
amendment and of these ten were properly ratified by the end of 1791.
To aid in the evaluation of this protection, reference should also
be made to the context of the provision. It should be noted that the
article in which it appears deals generally with the subject of criminal
procedure and that the "due process" provision, which guarantees
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law," comes immediately after the protections against
double jeopardy and forced self-incrimination.
Despite the efforts by the proponents of federal power to give
it a broader interpretation, the fifth amendment was limited in its
applicability, by judicial interpretation, to the federal government.
Consequently, it was supplemented after the Civil War with the
fourteenth amendment, which was designed to protect the loyal citi-
zens in the southern states as well as the recently freed men against
state rather than federal abuse. The fourteenth amendment, ratified
in 1868, is much less criminally oriented and provides in part that "no
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
44 The Patents of Elizabeth to Gilbert and Raleigh. Hazeltine, "Influence of
Magna Carta on American Development," in Malden, Magna Carta, Commemoration
Essays 187 (1917).
45 One of the first official acts of the Colony at Plymouth, in 1621, declared that
"justice should be impartially and promptly administered with trial by jury, and that
no person should suffer in life, limb, liberty, good name, or estate, but by due process
of law." Stevens, the Sources of the Constitution 208 (1894).
46 Beard, American Government and Politics 63 (1906).
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of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."
Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, "due process"
protections also became an indispensable part of the state constitu-
tions. While before the adoption of the fifth amendment, only eight
of the thirteen states had an equivalent of a "due process" clause,
every one of the new constitutions framed since the close of the Civil
War contains this phrase.47 Thus, even if the fourteenth amendment
were now repealed, but a small portion of the people of the United
States would be without this protection against state and federal
tyranny. The chief value of the fourteenth amendment remains, how-
ever, in the fact that by giving the federal courts jurisdiction it insures
a more uniform interpretation of these constitutional guarantees.
Now, what exactly does the "due process" protection require,
and how does this relate to the new trends in compulsory hospitaliza-
tion laws? For an answer we must go into the court cases and legal
commentaries that have dealt with this topic over the years. Here
one discovers a great divergence between English and American law.
In England the protections of the Magna Carta have been used
primarily to curb abuses of the executive and judicial branches.
Originating as a protection against a lawless monarchy, "due process"
never quite gained enough strength to impose its standards upon the
legislative power. Several attempts were made in this direction. Sir
Edward Coke, in particular, had strived to establish the principle
of judicial control over Parliament. The Levellers had placed the
basic constitutional rights far above ordinary statutes. Cromwell is
said to have had somewhat similar ideas.4" Likewise, Lock's discus-
sions of the limitations on the legislative process were certainly con-
trary to the idea of judicial impotence. 49
Yet, the main trend was away from the acceptance of judicial
review. If there remained any question as to the limits of the legisla-
tive power, Blackstone, who came in 1765, through his commentaries
and great influence set for all times the principle that Parliament was
omnipotent."" Thus, in practicality the overriding authority of the
Magna Carta became a matter of legislative self-restraint rather than
judicial review.
Different was the story in America. Quite early it was argued
and established here that the application of "due process" was not
limited to the administration of the penal code but extended equally
47 Mott, Due Process of Law 20 (1928).
48 Gooch, History of English Constitutional Ideas in the Seventeenth Century
184 (1898).
49 2 Lock, Two Treatises of Government, § 142 (1884).
50 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 91 (1884).
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to private civil suits. In an old Maryland case involving the owner-
ship of land-these being some of the most bitterly fought cases at
that time-one of the ablest of colonial lawyers, Daniel Dulany, suc-
cessfully argued that due process required notice and hearing before
land claims could be settled."'
Even prior to that the principle had been recognized that the
protections of the Magna Carta were intended not only against ad-
ministrative and judicial abuse, but against legislative tyranny as
well. During the middle of the 17th century, a series of acts was
enacted in Virginia which ran the whole way from an incidental regu-
lation of the practice of law to the absolute prohibition of the profes-
sion. When the most drastic of these acts was sent to the governor
for his approval, he returned it with the comment that he would agree
to it insofar as it was "agreeable to Magna Carta." 2 This appears to
be the first instance on record in which an exercise of the police power
in the colonies was questioned as being contrary to the "law of the
land."
Yet the tremendous power inherent in the constitutional protec-
tions of individual rights was not generally recognized for a long
time. In fact the first constitutional drafters believed that such
guarantees were intended merely as limitations on royal power and
meant little under a representative government. But once enacted,
the "due process" requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, as well as those of the state constitutions, turned out to be
sleeping giants. At first, some legal authorities took the position that
this guarantee was designed only to protect the criminal from arbi-
trary prosecution and imprisonment. This soon changed, and by the
time Cooley published his Constitutional Limitations in 1868, the
country was preparing to admit that "due process" imposed limitations
upon all branches of government and required, furthermore, that they
all cooperate to secure to the individual the basic legal protections
required by the settled maxims of the law. 3 At the turn of the
century, "due process" was well recognized, not merely as a protec-
tion against procedural abuse but as an effective limitation against
improper legislative extension of the police power. Ever since, "due
process" protections have been increasingly resorted to in both state
and federal courts.
It may be well to survey briefly the general procedural scope of
"due process," as interpreted by the courts, before we undertake to
determine what requirements it imposes on the substance and pro-
51 Lessee v. Beale, 1 H. & McH. (Md.) 67 (1726).
52 Mott, op. cit. supra note 47, at 114.
53 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 505 (1890).
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cedures of compulsory commitment. Although in the beginning there
was considerable thought, which was endorsed by Supreme Court
dicta, that "due process" secured a trial by jury,54 this view was soon
modified. The paring down of the broad original dicta to meet
numerous situations in which a jury trial was an unnecessary hardship
has been a continuing process ever since.55 About the middle of the
last century it was recognized that if the determination is not criminal
in nature, a jury trial was not a constitutional requisite. 6 This
principle was held applicable over the years in the cases of arrest and
confinement of diseased persons, paupers, inebriates and delinquent
children."
Subsequently, it was thought that if a jury trial was not essential,
a regular trial before some judicial body was a constitutional neces-
sity."8 This test of "due process" did not prove completely satisfactory
either. It soon became evident that there were certain kinds of de-
cisions which could not properly be made by a regular judicial body.
Consequently, the courts, after searching through the history of com-
mon law decisions, concluded that "due process" is not necessarily
"judicial process." 59 Then the courts developed the doctrine of notice
and hearing as essential prerequisites of legal propriety. This doc-
trine, that substantial rights could not be impaired without an oppor-
tunity being given to the defendant to present his case, was adopted
by the United States Supreme Court and became generally accepted
as a procedural necessity.6" But even this criterion was later found
to be too strict for universal application. Over the years exceptions
to the rule were upheld in tax assessment cases, where general notice
and a hearing at some stage of the proceeding were considered suffi-
cient, and in a great number of other quasi-judicial and quasi-legisla-
tive determinations.61
54 Bank of Columbia v. Okeley, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 235, 244 (1918) ; Greene v. Briggs,
1 Curt. (U.S.) 311 (1852).
55 White v. Kendrick, 1 Brev. (S. Car.) 469 (1805).
56 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. (1882).
5"7 In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908); Nott's Case, 11 Me. 208 (1834);
Cooper v. Schultz, 32 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 107 (1866).
58 See argument of Mason, counsel for plaintiff, in Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 65 N.H. 473 (1817); Newland v. March, 19 Il. 376 (1857); White v. White, 5
Bab. (N.Y.) 474 (1849); Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112 (1866).
59 United States v. JuTay, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505
(1903).
60 Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1377); Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U.S. 234 (1924).
61 Parley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272
(1912); Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 135
(1894); Atty. Gen. v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 407 (1922); Kreuger v. Colville,
49 Wash. 295, 95 Pac. 81 (1908).
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Searching for a flexible standard of "due process" that would be
applicable in all cases, the courts subsequently produced yet another
formula. This one defined "due process" as conformity to the pro-
cedures existing in the English common law before the revolution.2
If the common law was to be the test by which statutes were to be
judged, the courts could easily determine the legality of new legisla-
tion by the simple expedient of looking backward to the usage in
England prior to independence and judging the validity of all pro-
cedures by this yardstick. But this common law test tended to force
upon courts the colonial procedural form "like a straight jacket."63
Looking for a means of procedural reform without a drastic departure
from the past, the constitutional scholars, led by Judge Cooley,
developed the notion that the requirement of adherence to common
law had reference to the principles of the common law, not its specific
form. 4 Consequently, a new line of judicial thought developed re-
garding procedural guarantees. The key-note of the new attitude
was struck in 1884 in the case of Hurtado v. California,65 in which
the court declared that an indictment by a grand jury was not a
constitutional necessity if the accused is given substantially the same
protection as was accorded him by the old common law method.
Hurtado opened the way for a new approach. The concept of
"due process" that developed in the years that followed was suffi-
ciently flexible to meet a great variety of changing needs for which
the old mechanisms were no longer adequate. With the increasing
role of federal and state government in regulating the nation's moral,
social and economic life and the emergence of numerous quasi-judicial
and quasi-administrative bodies, the courts were beginning to look
to the inherent elements of justice in any determination of rights,
rather than to the form of the proceeding. 6 The newer attitude of
the United States Supreme Court toward the meaning and require-
ments of "due process" can be summarized by the words of Justice
Roberts, speaking for the majority in Betts v. Brady.67 In his opinion
he clearly explains that the due process of law clause of the fourteenth
amendment
:. . formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than envisaged
in the other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.
62 Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. (U.S.) 272 at 280
(1855); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518 at 667 (1819).
63 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
64 Cooley, op. cit. supra note 53, at 434.
65 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
6G Mott, op. cit. supra note 47, at 216.
67 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be
tested by an appraisal of the totality of the facts in a given case.68
A few years later Justice Burton gave even fuller recognition to the
fundamental fairness requirement of due process, rather than the
insistence of any set formula. Speaking in Bute v. Illinois,9 Justice
Burton said:
This due process is not an equivalent for the process of the federal
courts or for the process of any particular state. It has reference
rather to a standard of process that may cover many varieties of
processes that are expressive of differing combinations of historical
or modern, local or other judicial standards, provided they do not
conflict with the 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.' 70
"DUE PROCESS" AND COMMITMENT REFORM
The criticism of the present structure and operation of the com-
pulsory hospitalization laws can be summarized in four major objec-
tions: (1) that the commitment procedures resemble criminal pro-
ceedings and have an unfortunate traumatic effect upon the patient;
(2) that the taint of criminality that attaches to commitment is
partially responsible for the adverse public attitude toward mental
illness, its treatment and needs; (3) that the medical question of
hospitalization is improperly delegated to judicial officers who are
either not sufficiently informed or else too busy to discharge this func-
tion appropriately; and (4) that present admission procedures are
cumbersome and discourage speedy and early treatment.
To eliminate these objections one of two lines of reform may be
undertaken. The first, patterned along the features of the new English
Mental Health Bill, would make admission completely informal,
would do away with most procedural prerequisites for commitment,
and would eliminate the need for a prior judicial or administrative
determination. The commitment authority in this case would be
fully delegated to the admitting medical specialists. A less drastic
reform formula, which would still answer most present criticisms,
has been devised by several American states and has its best expres-
sion in the draft act prepared several years ago by the Federal
Security Agency. 7' This formula modifies markedly the trappings of
the commitment procedures, such as notice and presence, yet does not
68 Id. at 462.
69 333 U.S. 640, 649 (1948).
70 For a complete analysis of the recent judicial trend in the interpretation of due
process see Wood, Due Process of Law (1951).
71 National Institute of Mental Health, Federal Security Agency, A Draft Act




totally abolish the independent pre-hospitalization hearing. How
extensive a reform will our constitutional guarantees permit?
Whether or not the giving of notice to the alleged mentally ill
person of the proceedings initiated for his commitment is a con-
stitutional requisite has never been fully determined.7 1 In about
one-third of the states providing for judicial commitment, no provision
is made by statute for notice to the patient. Most of the other statutes
make notice mandatory. In practice the great majority of states re-
quire that the patient be notified. A few states provide that notice
is to be dispensed with if it is asserted that it will be injurious to
the patient's medical condition, in which case substituted notice will
suffice. Sixteen states, furthermore, require that notice of the pro-
ceedings are to be given to the relatives of the ill person and four
require notice to the guardian. The statutes do not usually specify
how much time before the hearing such notice is to be given; but the
value of notice is almost completely lost if twenty-four hour notice
is to be considered sufficient, which is the case in some states.
Numerous psychiatrists have decried the traumatic effect of per-
sonal notice on a person who is mentally ill.73 Legal papers, they say,
only produce anxiety and confusion in a sick mind. Such notice, it is
further said, is not only medically harmful but often also completely
useless in protecting the rights of the individual. These arguments
have received the support of some leading legal writers who feel
that ". .. where the person is mentally incapable of understanding
the nature of the proceeding or of preparing therefore, or is so de-
ranged that notice would do him harm, the purpose of protecting his
interest can be more effectively accomplished in some other way than
by serving him with legal papers."'74
In answer to the humanitarian plea for the abolishing of notice,
.it has been said that the traumatic effect of such notice could not
possibly be any worse than the trauma produced when one suddenly
finds himself detained in a mental institution without any prior
notification. Answering the argument that such notice would be in-
effective, it 1has been asked how we could pre-judge the alleged ill
person before the hearing and decide that he is too deranged to benefit
by it. Said the Kansas Court:
72 Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 39 AtI. 169 (1898); Olsen v. MacFeely, 202 Ga.
146, 42 S.E.2d 366 (1947); Georgia National Bank v. Liberty National Bank, 180 Ga.
4, 177 S.E. S03 (1934); Maxwell v. Mamvell, 189 Ia. 7, 177 N.W. 541 (1902); Re
Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944); Brayman v. Grant, 130 App. Div. 242,
114 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1909).
73 Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry Report, Commitment Procedure 2
(No. 4, April 4, 1949).
74 Guttmacher & Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 36, at 295.
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It will not do to say that it is useless to serve notice upon an
insane person; that it would avail nothing because of his inability
to take advantage of it. His sanity is the very thing to be tried.75
Although the question of notice has never been fully resolved, it
is highly questionable whether notice could be abolished altogether
without affecting the validity of the commitment procedures.7 6 On
the other hand, the practice of substituted notice, to the patient's
family or guardian, has been used in this country since the beginning
of the nineteenth century, and many of the writers feel that its pro-
visions are constitutional.77 But it is possibly only in cases where it
is established to the satisfaction of the court that personal notice will
be improper or dangerous to the alleged patient that substituted
notice would satisfy the requirements of "due process."
Since the legislative extension, last century, of the "due process"
requirements to commitment, it has been recognized that the alleged
mentally ill person is entitled to a hearing and is required to be
present at it.78 But there has been much opposition to these practices
recently from both medical and non-medical circles. It has been
claimed that
... the enforcement of this "right" may do more harm than good.
In many cases of mental illness . . . the patient is already suffer-
ing from the feeling that people dislike him and from delusions of
persecution. Requiring him to sit in a courtroom and listen to
his trusted physician and his nearest and dearest relatives testify
to the facts regarding his mental condition is likely to confirm his
worst suspicions. The result may be dangerous to them as well as
injurious to him.79
In general the same arguments have been made against the re-
quirement of a hearing as are made against notice.
Admission to mental hospitals, it has been frequently urged,
should resemble the informal admission procedure of general hospitals.0
The psychiatric profession and others believe that admission is pri-
marily a medical question and that an emphasis on judicial requisites,
such as notice, a formal hearing and the presence of the person to be
committed, is likely to produce traumatic and harmful experiences
for the patients. The most satisfactory commitment law, say they,
is one that changes the criminally-tainted judicial commitment pro-
75 In re Welman, 3 Kan. App. 100, 103, 45 Pac. 276 (1896).
76 Curran, op. cit. supra note 21, at 281.
77 Comment, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 747 (1942); Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 100 (1952);
50 Yale L.J. 1178, 1194 (1947).
78 In re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 Pac. 851 (1901) ; Appeal of Sleeper, 147 Me. 302,
84 A.2d 115 (1952) ; Ex parte Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 Atl. 1078 (1909).
79 Guttmacher & Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 36, at 298.
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ceeding into an administrative function, performed more speedily and
effectively by qualified medical experts. Commitments without a prior
hearing have consequently spread in many states.
Recently there has been increasing legal and popular opposition
to such summary commitments. "Any person, before he is com-
mitted to a mental hospital, or otherwise deprived of his liberty," say
the opponents, "should be served with notice and given a full oppor-
tunity to be heard." 0 It has also been emphasized recently that the
decision as to compulsory commitment is not a medical decision but
essentially a social one. Therefore, it must be based on a social criterion,
with medical experts giving evidence but with the decision being made
by a judicial officer as "a representative of society deputed for the
purpose.""' If no judicial hearing is provided for, we are warned,
commitment will be based on an exclusively medical criterion and will
be subject to no social check whatsoever. Considerable weight was
added recently to the movement against summary commitments by
a decision of the Missouri supreme court than an involuntary patient
may be held without a hearing only during an emergency.8 2 However,
if an emergency does not exist or the hospitalization extends beyond
the emergency, a hearing becomes a constitutional requisite.
Whether or not insistence on the traditional formalities of "due
process" is the most effective method for the protection of those
charged with mental illness is a difficult question. Possibly this is an
area where new and unorthodox methods provide better protection
than hurried, though legally correct, judicial hearing. It is uncertain
how much of a departure from traditional "due process" would be
allowed under our legal system, but many interesting proposals for
change have been made. It has been argued, for example, that ob-
servational detention, which would permit a careful diagnosis of the
patient, should always precede regular indeterminate commitment.
Likewise, the suggestions have been made that the cases of committed
patients should be automatically reviewed at regular intervals; that
a central state agency should be made responsible for the review of
all new commitments to guarantee conformity with the law; that
regular inspections should be undertaken of mental institutions; and
that legal counsel be provided to all patients who seek it.
In drafting the blueprints for reform, the call is frequently made
s0 72 Reports of the American Bar Association 295 (1947).
81 National Council for Civil Liberties, Submissions to the Minister of Health on
Recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and
Mental Deficiency 5 (1957).
82 Missouri ex rel. Fuller v. Mullfnas, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.V.2d 72 (1954).
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for a system ". . . containing more of the elements of a scientific
determination, with as little resort to adversary process as possible."83
Such an arrangement would require that decisions on commitment be
made by administrative experts and be based upon impartial investi-
gations of the individual and his surroundings. The most effective
procedural safeguard, supposedly, would not be notice and presence
of the person being confined but a requirement that the investigation
be exhaustive, searching out all relevant facts, and that those making
the investigation be properly qualified. This is a plea for the rule
of experts, rather than judges, which has been heard recently in other
legal fields and which will have to be answered generally and beyond
the mere boundaries of the commitment law.
CONCLUSION
The recent trends for the reformation of the nation's mental
institutions and their transformation from custodial storehouses to
therapeutic centers requires parallel modifications in the applicable
laws. In undertaking to reform the law, careful attention must be
given to the fundamental requirements of the constitutional guaran-
tees of individual rights. "Due process" of law, required by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution as well
as by most state constitutions, provides protection not merely against
procedural impropriety but also against substantative abuse through
the unreasonable extension of the police power.
Most of the recent court cases and legal commentaries which
have dealt with the propriety of the new legislative enactments in this
area have usually concerned themselves with the procedural rather
than the substantative phases of the reform. Yet possibly it is the
latter that proposes the most serious infringement upon the "due
process" protection. It is highly questionable whether compulsory
treatment can be properly extended to unwilling mental patients who
remain rational and who do not pose a "clear" and "present" danger
to social order and safety. Although the need of early treatment,
before the patient becomes a source of danger, is recognized, such
treatment should be accomplished through the encouragement of
voluntary hospitalization rather than through compulsory process.
The constitutional requirements of "due process" should not
pose serious difficulties for the adoption of the needed procedural
reform of the mental treatment laws. Admission to mental institutions
in England and in America throughout the colonial period was ex-
tremely informal. If conformity with "due process" is to be deter-
83 Note, "Three Controversial Aspects of New Illinois Mental Health Legislation,"
47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 100 (1952-53).
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mined by the procedures that existed under the common law, then
the existing procedural complex is certainly superfluous. Most of
the present, stringent requirements, originating in the Sixties and
Seventies of the last century, are the products of an overzealous
campaign against abuses, both fancied and real. But the present
transformation and opening-up of mental institutions will provide the
patient better protection. The best protection for the patient's rights is
now afforded not so much through insistence on legal formalities as
through the changing character of institutional care.
At the same time, the recent history of commitment cases indi-
cates that our courts may be unwilling to do away altogether with the
right to an independent hearing before a patient is committed for
an indeterminate period. Thus, while a reform completely abolishing
the pre-commitment hearing, as undertaken in Britain, is unlikely in
this country, less extreme modifications are possible. Mental treat-
ment laws are motivated by a social philosophy totally different from
that which produces the criminal law in that they seek to benefit the
individual rather than punish him. Consequently, a more liberal
attitude toward procedural protections would be in order in the case
of the commitment laws. It would appear that the historical flexibility
of the concept of "due process," as well as the recent emphasis upon
substantial justice rather than procedural dogmatism, should permit
the adoption of less rigid legal procedures that will continue to
protect individual liberties while making admission to institutions less
cumbersome and less traumatic. Under such new procedures it would
be well to concern ourselves less with the procedural niceties of the
commitment process and devote more attention to the protection of
patient rights after admission-to the end that they receive early
treatment, that their cases be constantly reviewed and that they be
speedily discharged.
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